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We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and
prices. The motivating example is a communication network where service providers invest in capacities
and then compete in prices. Our model economy corresponds to a two-stage game. First, firms (service
providers) independently choose their capacity levels. Second, after the capacity levels are observed,
they set prices. Given the capacities and prices, users (consumers) allocate their demands across the
firms. We first establish the existence of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (oligopoly equilibria)
and characterize the set of equilibria. These equilibria feature pure strategies along the equilibrium
path, but off-the-equilibrium path they are supported by mixed strategies. We then investigate the
efficiency properties of these equilibria, where "efficiency" is defined as the ratio of surplus in equilibrium
relative to the first best. We show that efficiency in the worst oligopoly equilibria of this game can
be arbitrarily low. However, if the best oligopoly equilibrium is selected (among multiple equilibria),
the worst-case efficiency loss has a tight bound, approximately equal to 5/6 with 2 firms. This bound
monotonically decreases towards zero when the number of firms increases. We also suggest a simple
way of implementing the best oligopoly equilibrium. With two firms, this involves the lower-cost
firm acting as a Stackelberg leader and choosing its capacity first. We show that in this Stackelberg
game form, there exists a unique equilibrium corresponding to the best oligopoly equilibrium. We
also show that an alternative game form where capacities and prices are chosen simultaneously always
fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium. These results suggest that the timing of capacity and price
choices in oligopolistic environments is important both for the existence of equilibrium and for the



















This paper studies oligopoly competition in the presence of capacity investments. Our motivation
comes from large-scale communication networks, particularly the Internet, which has undergone
major decentralization since the mid 1990s. These changes have spurred interest in new decentral-
ized network protocols and architectures that take into account the noncooperative interactions
between users and service providers. A key question in the analysis of these new network structures
is the extent of e±ciency losses in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the e±cient allocation
of resources. Most of the work in this literature investigates the e±ciency losses resulting from
the allocation of users and information °ows across di®erent paths or administrative domains in
an already established network (see, for example, [13], [2], [3], [1], [7]). Arguably, the more im-
portant economic decisions in large-scale communication networks concern the investments in the
structure of the network and in bandwidth capacity. In fact, the last 20 years have witnessed sig-
ni¯cant investments in broadband, high-speed and optical networks. Our objective in this paper
is to model price and capacity competition between service providers and investigate the e±ciency
properties of the resulting equilibria. Following previous research in this area, we provide explicit
bounds on the e±ciency losses by providing various worst-case performance results for equilibria.
Our model consists of N ¯rms (service providers) and a mass of consumers wishing to send a
¯xed amount of °ow from a ¯xed source origin to a given destination using subnetworks operated
by these ¯rms. Each user has an inelastic demand with a reservation utility R. Firms face
a linear and potentially di®erent cost of investing to expand the capacity of their subnetwork.
For simplicity, we assume that once capacity is installed, there is no additional cost of allowing
consumers to use the subnetwork. In our baseline model, ¯rms play a two-stage game. They ¯rst
choose the level of capacity in their subnetwork, and then set prices for consumers to use their
subnetwork. This game has an obvious similarity to Kreps and Scheinkman's well-known model
of quantity precommitment and price competition for two ¯rms, [9], but it is simpler because
demand is inelastic.
For expositional purposes, we start with the special case with two ¯rms. For this case, we fully
characterize the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria and prove that a pure strategy
equilibrium always exists. As in [9], subgame perfect equilibria in which ¯rms use pure strategies
along the equilibrium path are nonetheless supported by mixed strategies o® the equilibrium path.
As part of our equilibrium analysis, we also provide a complete characterization of the set of mixed
strategy equilibria following any choices of capacities by ¯rms.
We then investigate the e±ciency properties of equilibria in the worst-case scenarios. We
1quantify e±ciency as the ratio of social surplus in equilibrium relative to the maximum value of
social surplus (in the hypothetical ¯rst best). Since the game typically has multiple pure strategy
equilibria, there are two possible approaches to quantifying worst-case scenarios. The ¯rst, referred
to as \the Price of Anarchy" in the computer science and previous network economics literature,
looks at the worst-case scenario in terms of the possible values of the parameters and selects
the worst equilibrium if there are multiple equilibria. The second, referred to as \the Price of
Stability," selects the best equilibrium for any given set of parameters and then looks for the
worst-case values of the parameters (see [8], [2]).
Our ¯rst result is that even in the simplest structure with linear costs, the Price of Anarchy is
equal to zero, meaning that the equilibrium can be arbitrarily ine±cient. Our second major result
is that once we focus on the Price of Stability there is a tight bound of 2
p
2 ¡ 2 ' 5=6, meaning
that if the (socially) best equilibrium is selected, the maximum ine±ciency that may result from
capacity competition is no more than approximately 1/6 of the maximal social surplus. These
results suggest that even in the simplest capacity games if the \incorrect" equilibria arise, there
could be very large ine±ciencies, but if the \appropriate" equilibrium is selected, capacity and
price competition between two ¯rms is su±cient to ensure a high degree of e±ciency.
We also suggest a simple way of implementing the best equilibrium, by considering a game
form in which ¯rms make their capacity choices sequentially, in reverse order according to their
costs of investing in capacity. In the special case with two ¯rms, this corresponds to a situation
in which the ¯rm with the lower cost of capacity investment acts as the Stackelberg leader. This
\Stackelberg" game may be implemented by some type of regulation, for example by giving a
¯rst-mover advantage to lower-cost ¯rms, or it may arise as the focal point in the game. We
show that this Stackelberg game has a unique (pure strategy) equilibrium and ine±ciency in this
equilibrium is bounded by 2
p
2 ¡ 2 ' 5=6.
We also show that our main results generalize to the game with N ¯rms. For this case, we
characterize the pure strategy equilibria using a slightly di®erent argument, and then show that
the Price of Anarchy (the combination of worst-case parameters and worst equilibrium) is again
equal to zero. Moreover, there is again a bound on the Price of Stability (the combination of
worst-case parameters with the selection of best equilibrium), equal to 2(
p
N ¡ 1)=(N ¡ 1), and
we show that this bound is also tight.
The di®erences in the structure of equilibria and the extent of ine±ciency between our baseline
game and the Stackelberg game suggest that the timing of moves is an important determinant of
the extent of ine±ciency in this class of games. This raises the natural question of how the set of
2equilibria will be a®ected when pricing and capacity decisions are made simultaneously. We show
that in this case there never exists a pure strategy equilibrium, which starkly contrasts with the
result that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists in the sequential game. This nonexistence of
equilibrium results from the ability of the ¯rms to deviate simultaneously on their capacities and
prices. In contrast, in the sequential game, a ¯rm could only deviate by changing its capacity ¯rst,
and then its rivals could also respond by adjusting their prices to this deviation. Since the sequence
of events in which capacities are chosen ¯rst and then prices are set later is more reasonable (in
the sense that it constitutes a better approximation to a situation in which prices can change at
much higher frequencies than capacities), we do not view this result as negative. Nonetheless, it
suggests that it is important for industries with major capacity investments to choose structures
of regulation that do not allow simultaneous deviations on capacities and prices.
In addition to the newly-burgeoning literature on competition and cooperation between users
and ¯rms in communication networks, this paper is closely related to the industrial organization
literature on capacity competition. Classic contributions here include Levitan and Shubik, [11],
Kreps and Scheinkman, [9], and Davidson and Deneckere [5]. A key issue in these papers is the
rationing rule when total demand exceeds capacity. Our simpler framework with inelastic demand
avoids this issue and enables us to provide a complete characterization of the full set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria.
Most closely related to our paper is the recent work by Weintraub, Johari, and Van Roy, [15],
who add investment decisions to the model of price competition with congestion externalities in
[1] and study the e±ciency properties of oligopoly equilibria. Weintraub, Johari, and Van Roy put
very little restriction on how investments may a®ect congestion costs, but only focus on the case in
which all ¯rms are symmetric and there are no capacity constraints. In this case, an equilibrium,
when it exists, is always e±cient. The distinguishing feature of our work is to consider and
fully characterize the equilibria in the general non-symmetric case (where ine±ciencies are indeed
important as shown by our unbounded Price of Anarchy result) and also to introduce capacity
constraints, which are a realistic feature of most communication networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
de¯nes the price-capacity competition game and the oligopoly equilibria in this game. Section 4
characterizes the continuation price equilibria and the pro¯ts in the capacity subgames. Section
5 focuses on the special case with two ¯rms and characterizes pure strategy oligopoly equilibria
of the game (as well as the mixed strategy o®-the-equilibrium play). Section 6 contains our main
results and provides various e±ciency bounds for the set of pure strategy oligopoly equilibria for
3the case of two ¯rms. Section 7 generalizes the existence and e±ciency results to an arbitrary
number of ¯rms. Section 8 shows how the best oligopoly equilibria can be implemented by a
multi-stage game, where the low-cost ¯rm acts as the Stackelberg leader. Section 9 analyzes a
related game with simultaneous capacity-price decisions and shows that this game never has a
pure strategy equilibrium. Section 10 concludes.
2 Model
We start with the general model with N ¯rms. Each ¯rm can be thought of as a service provider
operating its own communication subnetwork. For this reason, we refer to the demands for the
¯rms' services as \°ows". We denote total °ow for ¯rm i 2 f1;:::;Ng by xi ¸ 0; and use
x = (x1;:::;xN) to denote the vector of °ows. We assume that ¯rm i has a capacity ci ¸ 0, and
°ow allocated to ¯rm i cannot exceed its capacity, i.e., xi · ci. We denote the vector of capacities
by c = (c1;:::;cN). Investing in capacity is costly. In particular, the cost of capacity ci for ¯rm i
is °ici, where °i > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng.1 For simplicity (and without loss of generality), we ignore
additional costs of servicing °ows. We denote the price charged by ¯rm i (per unit °ow) by pi
and denote the vector of prices by p = (p1;:::;pN).
We are interested in the problem of allocating d units of aggregate °ow between these N
¯rms and without loss of generality, we set d = 1. We assume that this is the aggregate °ow of
many \small" users.2 We also assume that the users have a reservation utility R; they choose
the lowest cost ¯rm whenever there is unused capacity with this ¯rm and do not participate if
the lowest available cost exceeds the reservation utility. Further, we assume throughout the paper
that °i · R for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng. This is without loss of generality, since any ¯rm with °i > R
will have no incentive to be active and can be excluded from the set i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
We start with a de¯nition of °ow equilibrium given a vector of capacities c and a vector of
prices p.
De¯nition 1 [Flow Equilibrium] For a given capacity vector c ¸ 0 and price vector p ¸ 0, a
vector x¤ is a °ow equilibrium if









1Alternatively, we could assume °i ¸ 0, with essentially the same results, but in this case Propositions 7 and 13
below need to be modi¯ed slightly, since there could be excess capacity in some equilibria.
2In the presence of additional congestion costs, this small users assumption would lead to the Wardrop principle,
commonly used in communication and transport networks (see [14]), where °ows are routed along paths with
minimum e®ective cost (see, for example, [10], [1]). In our context, there is no need to introduce this concept and
it su±ces to observe that users will choose a lower cost provider whenever this is possible.
4We denote the set of °ow equilibria at a given p and c by W[p;c].
This de¯nition captures the simple notion that users will allocate their demand to the lowest
price ¯rm up to the point where the capacity constraint of this ¯rm is reached. After this, if there
are any more users, they will allocate their capacity to the second lowest price ¯rm (as long as its
price does not exceed their reservation utility, R), and so on.
Using the optimality conditions for problem (1), it follows that a vector x¤ ¸ 0 is a °ow
equilibrium if and only if
PN
i=1 x¤






for i 2 f1;:::;Ng,
R ¡ pi · ¸ if x¤
i = 0; (2)
= ¸ if 0 < x¤
i < ci;
¸ ¸ if x¤
i = ci:
This is a convenient representation of the °ow equilibrium, which will be used in the analysis
below. The following result on the structure of °ow equilibria is an immediate consequence of this
characterization (proof omitted):
Proposition 1 Let c = (c1;:::;cN) be a capacity vector and p = (p1;:::;pN) be a price vector.
Suppose that for some M · N, we have p1 < p2 < ::: < pM · R < pM+1 (with the convention












for all 2 · m · M.
Remark 1 If instead of p1 < p2 < ::: < pM · R, we have pi = pj for some i 6= j, the °ow
equilibrium is not necessarily unique, since users would be indi®erent between allocating their
°ow across these two ¯rms. Note also that in the special case with N = 2, this proposition simply
states that when p1 < p2 · R, the unique °ow equilibrium will involve x1 = minfc1;1g and
x2 = minfc2;1 ¡ x1g.
We next de¯ne the social optimum, which is the capacity and °ow allocation that would be
chosen by a planner that has full information and full control over the allocation of resources.
5Since there is no cost of servicing °ows beyond the capacity costs, the following de¯nition for a
social optimum follows immediately.













xi · ci; i 2 f1;:::;Ng:
The social problem has a continuous objective function and a compact constraint set, guar-
anteeing the existence of a social optimum (cS;xS). It is also clear from the preceding that we
have cS
i = xS
i , for i 2 f1;:::;Ng. We refer to cS as the social capacity. In view of the fact that
cS
i = xS
i , for i 2 f1;:::;Ng, the social capacity is given as the solution to the following maximization
problem:














(R ¡ °i)ci; (5)
i.e., the di®erence between the users' utility and the total capacity cost.
3 Price and Capacity Competition Game
We next consider the two-stage competition game in which capacities are chosen ¯rst and then
¯rms compete in prices as outlined in the previous section.
The price-capacity competition game is as follows. First, the N ¯rms simultaneously choose
their capacities, i.e., ¯rm i chooses ci at cost °ici. At the second stage, ¯rms, having observed the
capacities set at the ¯rst stage, simultaneously choose prices, i.e., ¯rm i charges a price pi. Given
the price vector of other ¯rms, denoted by p¡i, the pro¯t of ¯rm i is
¦i[pi;p¡i;x;ci;c¡i] = pixi ¡ °ici;
where x 2 W[p;c] is a °ow equilibrium given the price vector p and the capacity vector c. The
objective of each ¯rm is to maximize pro¯ts. We refer to the dynamic game between the two
6¯rms as the price-capacity competition game, and look for the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE)
of this game. Since the capacities set in the ¯rst stage are observed by all ¯rms, every capacity
vector c = (c1;:::;cN) de¯nes a proper subgame, and subgame perfection requires that in each
subgame, the continuation equilibrium strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.3 For each capacity
subgame, we ¯rst de¯ne the price equilibrium between the ¯rms, which we will also refer to as
the (continuation) Price Equilibrium. As we will see below, pure strategy equilibria will fail to
exist in some capacity subgames. For this reason, we de¯ne both pure and mixed strategy price
equilibria. Let B denote the space of all (Borel) probability measures on the interval [0;R]. Let
¹i 2 B be a probability measure, and denote by ¹ 2 BN the product measure ¹1 £ ::: £ ¹N, and
by ¹¡i the product measure ¹ excluding ¹i (i.e., ¹¡i = ¹1 £ ::: £ ¹i¡1 £ ¹i+1 £ ::: £ ¹N).
De¯nition 3 [Price Equilibrium] Let c ¸ 0 be a capacity vector. A vector [p(c);x(c)] is a pure
strategy Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame if x(c) 2 W[p(c);c] and for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng,
¦i[pi(c);p¡i(c);x(c);c] ¸ ¦i[pi;p¡i(c);x;c]; 8 pi ¸ 0; 8 x 2 W[pi;p¡i(c);c]: (6)
We denote the set of pure strategy price equilibria at a given c by PE(c).
A vector [¹c;xc(p)] is a mixed strategy Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame if ¹c 2 BN


















for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng and ¹i 2 B. We denote the set of mixed strategy price equilibria at a given c
by MPE(c):
In the following, with a slight abuse of notation, we will write [¹;x(¢)] 2 MPE(c) for mixed
strategy equilibria.4 Note that here x(¢) is not a vector, but a function of p, i.e., x(p) is a selection
from the correspondence W(p;c). We denote the pro¯ts for ¯rm i in the mixed strategy price
3A subgame is identi¯ed with the public history (of previous moves). Hence, the SPE notion requires that the
action prescribed by each player's strategy is optimal given the other player's strategies, after every history; see, for
example, [6], [12].
4Note also that the pure strategy Price Equilibrium notion here may appear slightly stronger than the stan-
dard subgame perfection, since it requires that a strategy pro¯le yields higher pro¯ts for each player for all
x 2 W [pi;p¡i (c);c], rather than for some such x. Nevertheless, [1] shows, for a more general game, that this
de¯nition of equilibrium coincides with the standard pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (but is slightly more
convenient to work with). Given this relation, we have PE(c) ½ MPE(c), in the sense that for every [p;x] 2 PE(c),
there exists [¹;x(¢)] 2 MPE(c) such that ¹ is the degenerate measure with ¹(fpg) = 1, and x(¢) is an arbitrary
selection from W [p;c] with x(p) = x.





We will also use the notation ¦i[pi;¹¡i;x(¢);c] for some pi 2 [0;R] to denote the expected pro¯ts
when ¯rm i uses the degenerate mixed strategy ¹i with ¹i(pi) = 1, while the remaining ¯rms use
the mixed strategy ¹¡i.
Note that since the pro¯t functions are discontinuous in prices, it is not obvious that each
capacity subgame has a mixed strategy price equilibrium. In the next section, we will show that
in each capacity subgame c, a pure or mixed strategy price equilibrium always exists.
We next de¯ne the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game. For notational convenience,
we focus on the actions along the equilibrium path to represent the subgame perfect equilibrium.
De¯nition 4 [Oligopoly Equilibrium] A vector [cOE;p(cOE);x(cOE)] is a (pure strategy)
Oligopoly Equilibrium (OE) if [p(cOE);x(cOE)] 2 PE(cOE) and for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng,
¦i[p(cOE);x(cOE);(cOE
i ;cOE
¡i )] ¸ ¦i[¹;x(¢);(ci;cOE
¡i )]; (8)
for all ci ¸ 0, and for all [¹;x(¢)] 2 MPE(ci;cOE
¡i ). We refer to cOE as the OE capacity.
Note that pure strategy OE may involve pure strategies along the equilibrium path, but mixed
strategy continuation price equilibria in some o®-the-equilibrium subgames. Throughout the pa-
per, pure strategy OE refers to equilibria where pure strategies are used along the equilibrium
path.
4 Price Equilibria in the Capacity Subgame With Two Firms
Our ¯rst task is to characterize the entire set of subgame perfect equilibria in this game. For
expositional purposes, we start with the case where N = 2, which enables us to provide an explicit
characterization of the equilibria and the extent of the e±ciency losses. We generalize our main
results to an arbitrary number of ¯rms in Section 7 below.
We consider an arbitrary capacity subgame, and then prove the existence of pure or mixed
strategy price equilibria and provide a characterization of these equilibria. We will then use
this characterization to determine the form of oligopoly equilibria and analyze their e±ciency
properties. Since in this and in the next section we consider only two ¯rms, we sometimes refer
to these two ¯rms using the indices i and ¡i.
84.1 Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Price Equilibria With Two Firms
Proposition 2 Let c be a capacity vector such that c1 + c2 · 1 and ci > 0 for i = 1;2. Then
there exists a unique Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame [p;x] such that pi = R and xi = ci
for i = 1;2.
Proof. Since c1 + c2 · 1, it follows by the equivalent characterization of a °ow equilibrium [cf.
equation (2)] that for all p 2 [0;R]2, the °ow allocation (c1;c2) 2 W(p;c). Therefore, by charging
a price pi, ¯rm i can make a pro¯t of
¦i[pi;p¡i;x;c] = pici;
for all p¡i 2 [0;R]. This shows that pi = R strictly dominates all other price strategies of ¯rm i,
so that pi = R and xi = ci, i = 1;2, is the unique Price Equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 Let c be a capacity vector such that c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1
for some i. Then there exists no pure strategy Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame.
Proof. Suppose there exists a pure strategy Price Equilibrium (p;x). The following list con-
siders all candidates for a Price Equilibrium and pro¯table unilateral deviations from each, thus
establishing the nonexistence of a pure strategy Price Equilibrium:
² Suppose p1 < p2. Then the pro¯t of ¯rm 1 is ¦1[p;x;c] = p1 minfc1;1g. A small increase in
p1 will increase ¯rm 1's pro¯ts, thus ¯rm 1 has an incentive to deviate.
² Suppose p1 = p2 > 0. If x1 < minfc1;1g, then ¯rm 1 has an incentive to decrease its price.
If x1 = minfc1;1g, then, since c1 + c2 > 1, ¯rm 2 has an incentive to decrease its price.
² Suppose p1 = p2 = 0. Since by assumption ci < 1 for some i, ¯rm ¡i has an incentive to
increase its price and make positive pro¯ts.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 Let c be a capacity vector such that c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1
for some i. Then there exists a mixed strategy Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame.
Proof. The subgame following any capacity choice c is a special case of the model in [1]. Building
on [4], Proposition 4.3 in [1] establishes that there always exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in
any such subgame. We do not repeat this proof here to avoid repetition. Q.E.D.
When c1;c2 ¸ 1, the capacity subgame is an uncapacitated Bertrand price competition between
two ¯rms. Thus, we immediately have the following result (proof omitted).
9Proposition 5 Let c be a capacity vector such that c1;c2 ¸ 1. Then, for all Price Equilibria
[p;x], we have pi = 0 for i = 1;2, i.e., both ¯rms make zero pro¯ts.
4.2 Characterization of Mixed Strategy Price Equilibria
We next provide an explicit characterization of the mixed strategy price equilibria and the pro¯ts
in each capacity subgame.
Let c = (c1;c2) be a capacity vector. Throughout this section, we focus on the case where
c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1 for some i. By Proposition 4, there exists a mixed
strategy Price Equilibrium [¹;x(¢)] in the capacity subgame. Let ui denote the upper support of
¹i, and li denote the lower support of ¹i, i.e.,
ui = inf
n





p : ¹i(fp ¸ pg) = 1
o
:
Let (F1;F2) denote the corresponding cumulative distribution functions for the measure (¹1;¹2),
i.e., Fi(¹ p) = ¹i(fp · ¹ pg), for i = 1;2.
Recall that [¹;x(¢)] is a mixed strategy Price Equilibrium if and only if
¦i[p;¹¡i;x(¢);c] · ¦E
i ; (9)
for all p 2 [0;R], and there exists a set ¹ Pi ½ [li;ui] such that ¹i( ¹ Pi) = 1 and
¦i [p;¹¡i;x(¢);c] = ¦E
i for all p 2 ¹ Pi: (10)
(see, e.g., [12]). We will now use this property of mixed strategy equilibria to derive three lemmas
that will allow us to explicitly characterize the unique mixed strategy Price Equilibrium in the
capacity subgame.
Lemma 1 Assume that c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1 for some i. Then, for any
i = 1;2, the mixed strategy ¹i cannot have all its mass concentrated at a single point, i.e., ¹i
cannot be degenerate.
Proof. By Proposition 3, both ¹i's cannot be degenerate. To obtain a contradiction, assume that
¹1 is degenerate at some p1 2 [0;R] (i.e., ¹1(fp = p1g) = 1). We ¯rst show that ¹2(fp < p1g) = 0.
Consider p1 > 0. Charging the price p2 = p1¡² for some ² > 0 yields a pro¯t of (p1 ¡ ²)minfc2;1g
for ¯rm 2, which is strictly decreasing in ², showing that ¹2(fp < p1g) = 0. We next show that ¹2
cannot have an atom at p = p1. Suppose it does; then there is a positive probability of both ¯rms
10charging the price p1. If x2(p1;p1) < minfc2;1g, then charging a price of p1 ¡ ± for some small
± > 0 generates higher pro¯ts for ¯rm 2. If x2(p1;p1) = minfc2;1g, then, since c1 + c2 > 1, the
same applies to player 1, showing that ¹2 cannot have an atom at p2. Finally, if ¯rm 2 charges
the price p2 = p1 + ² for 0 < ² · R ¡ p1, it yields a pro¯t of (p1 + ²)(1 ¡ minfc1;1g), which is
strictly increasing in ², thus ¹2 should have all its mass concentrated at p2 = R. However both
¹i's cannot be degenerate, thus we arrive at a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 Assume that c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1 for some i. Then:
(i) F1 and F2 have the same lower support, i.e., l1 = l2 = l.
(ii) F1 and F2 have the same upper support, i.e., u1 = u2 = u.
(iii) F1 and F2 are strictly increasing over [l;u].
Proof.
(i) Assume that l1 < l2. Let p1 2 ¹ P1; p0
1 2 ¹ P1 be two prices such that p1 < p0
1 < l2. Then,
by Proposition 1, it follows that for all p2 2 ¹ P2 and p = p1 or p = p0
1, any °ow equilibrium
x 2 W[(p;p2);c] satis¯es x1 = minfc1;1g. Thus the pro¯ts of ¯rm 1 at prices p1; p0
1 are
given by




(ii) Assume that u1 > u2. Let p1 2 ¹ P1; p0
1 2 ¹ P1 be two prices such that u2 < p1 < p0
1. Then, by
Proposition 1 and the assumption c1 + c2 > 1, it follows that for all p2 2 ¹ P2 and p = p1 or
p = p0
1, any °ow equilibrium x 2 W[(p;p2);c] satis¯es x1 = 1 ¡ minfc2;1g. Thus the pro¯ts
of ¯rm 1 at prices p1; p0
1 are given by




(iii) Assume to arrive at a contradiction that F1 is constant over the interval [p1;p0
1] for some
p1;p0
1 2 [l;u] with p1 < p0
1. We will ¯rst show that this implies F2 is constant over the
same interval. Suppose F2 is not constant over this interval, which implies the existence of
p2; p0
2 2 ¹ P2 such that p1 < p2 < p0
2 < p0
1. By Proposition 1 and the assumption c1 + c2 > 1,




1 ¡ minfc1;1g if p < p1;
minfc2;1g if p > p0
1:
11Since F1 is constant over [p1;p0
1], this implies that the pro¯ts of ¯rm 2 at p0
2 are higher than
those at p2, which, since p2;p0
2 2 ¹ P2, leads to a contradiction. Hence, the distributions F1 and
F2 are constant over [p1;p0
1]. By a similar argument as above, it follows that p2 = p0
1 yields
higher pro¯ts than p2 = p1 for ¯rm 2, leading to another contradiction and establishing this
part of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Assume that c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1 for some i. Then:
(i) The distribution Fi, i = 1;2, does not have any atoms except possibly at the upper support
u.
(ii) Both distributions Fi cannot have an atom at the upper support u.
(iii) The upper support u is equal to R.
Proof.
(i) Without loss of generality, we consider F1. We ¯rst show that F1 cannot have an atom
at any p 2 (l;u). Assume to arrive at a contradiction that there exists an atom at some
p 2 (l;u), i.e., F1 (p+) > F1 (p¡). By Lemma 2(iii), F2 is strictly increasing over the interval
[l;u] (which satis¯es l < u in view of Lemma 1). Thus, there exists some ² > 0 su±ciently
small such that the prices p ¡ ² and p + ² belong to ¹ P2, and p + ² < R. Using Proposition
1, the pro¯ts of ¯rm 2 at these two prices can be written as
¦2[p ¡ ²;¹1;x(¢);c] = F1 (p ¡ ²)(p ¡ ²)(1 ¡ minfc1;1g) + (1 ¡ F1 (p ¡ ²))(p ¡ ²)minfc2;1g;
and
¦2[p + ²;¹1;x(¢);c] = F1 (p + ²)(p + ²)(1 ¡ minfc1;1g) + (1 ¡ F1 (p + ²))(p + ²)minfc2;1g:
Since F1 (p+) > F1 (p¡) and minfc2;1g > 1¡minfc1;1g, it follows that for small enough ²,
we have
¦2[p ¡ ²;¹1;x(¢);c] > ¦2[p + ²;¹1;x(¢);c];
yielding a contradiction.
We next show that F1 cannot have an atom at p = l. We ¯rst prove that the common lower
support must satisfy l > 0. If l = 0, since l 2 ¹ Pi for i = 1;2 [cf. Lemma 2(iii)], this implies
12that the pro¯ts of either ¯rm at any price vector are equal to 0. Since by assumption ci < 1
for some i, the pro¯ts of ¯rm ¡i at p = u cannot be equal to 0 at any °ow equilibrium.
Hence, it follows that l > 0. Consider the pro¯ts of ¯rm 2 at price l ¡² for some su±ciently
small ²,
¦2[l ¡ ²;¹1;x(¢);c] = (l ¡ ²)minfc2;1g:
Consider next the pro¯ts of ¯rm 2 at the price l + ², which belongs to ¹ P2:
¦2[l + ²;¹1;x(¢);c] = (1 ¡ F1(l + ²))(l + ²)minfc2;1g + F1(l + ²)(l + ²)(1 ¡ minfc1;1g):
If there is an atom at l, i.e., F1(l+) > 0, then since 1 ¡ minfc1;1g < minfc2;1g, it follows
from the preceding two relations that for su±ciently small ²,
¦2[l ¡ ²;¹1;x(¢);c] > ¦2[l + ²;¹1;x(¢);c];
contradicting equation (9).
(ii) Assume that both distributions have an atom at p = u. Then, it follows that with probability
[F1 (u+) ¡ F1 (u¡)] ¢ [F2 (u+) ¡ F2 (u¡)] > 0, both ¯rms will be charging a price of p = u.
Suppose x1 (u;u) < minfc1;1g. Then charging a price of p1 = u¡² generates higher pro¯ts
for ¯rm 1 than charging a price of p1 = u. If x1 (u;u) = minfc1;1g, then, since c1 + c2 > 1,
the same applies to player 2, establishing this part of the lemma.
(iii) Assume that u < R. By part (ii), it follows that there is no atom at u for one of the players,
say player 2. Then
¦1[u;¹2;x(¢);c] = u(1 ¡ minfc2;1g) < ¦1[R;¹2;x(¢);c] = R(1 ¡ minfc2;1g);
showing that the upper support u cannot be strictly less than R.
Q.E.D.
The next proposition characterizes the expected pro¯ts of the two ¯rms in capacity subgames
with continuation mixed strategy price equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Let c = (c1;c2) be a capacity vector with c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and
ci < 1 for some i. Let [¹;x(¢)] be a mixed strategy Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame c.




minfc¡i;1g ¡ °ici; if ci · c¡i;
R(1 ¡ c¡i) ¡ °ici; otherwise:
13Proof. Assume that c1 · c2. We denote the equilibrium pro¯ts of player i in the capacity
subgame c by ¦E
i . We will now use the characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium in equation
(10) to explicitly characterize the equilibrium distributions F1 and F2. Note that we have li 2 ¹ Pi
and ui 2 ¹ Pi.
By Lemma 3(i), the distributions F1 and F2 do not contain an atom except possibly at the
upper support R. Using the Flow Equilibrium characterization given in Proposition 1, we can
write the expected pro¯ts of ¯rm 1 for any p1 2 ¹ P1, p1 6= R as
¦1[p1;¹2;x(¢);c] = p1c1(1 ¡ F2(p1)) + p1(1 ¡ minfc2;1g)F2(p1) ¡ °1c1;
= ¦E
1 :
Similarly, for all p2 2 ¹ P2, and p2 6= R, we have





1 +°1c1 and ¹ ¦E
2 = ¦E
2 +°2c2. Solving for F1(p) and F2(p) in the preceding relations,
we obtain
F1(p) =
minfc2;1g ¡ ¹ ¦E
2 =p
c1 + minfc2;1g ¡ 1
; 8 p 2 ¹ P1; p 6= R; (11)
F2(p) =
c1 ¡ ¹ ¦E
1 =p
c1 + minfc2;1g ¡ 1
; 8 p 2 ¹ P2; p 6= R:
Let l denote the common lower support of ¹1 and ¹2, i.e., l1 = l2 = l (cf. Lemma 2). Using
F1(l) = F2(l) = 0, it follows that l = ¹ ¦E
2 =minfc2;1g, and
¹ ¦E





By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3(iii), we have u1 = u2 = R. We next show that F1 does not have an
atom at u = R, and therefore the characterization in (11) is also valid for p = R. Assume to
arrive at a contradiction that F1 has an atom at R, i.e., F1(R¡) < 1. Then, using c1 · c2 and the
preceding relation between ¹ ¦E
1 and ¹ ¦E
2 , it follows that F2(R¡) < 1. But, by Lemma 3(ii), both
distributions cannot have an atom at the upper support, yielding a contradiction. Hence, we can
use the characterization in (11) for p = R to write
F1(R) = 1 =
minfc2;1g ¡ ¹ ¦E
2 =R










The argument for c1 ¸ c2 is similar and completes the proof. Q.E.D.
5 Oligopoly Equilibria With Two Firms
In this section, we prove the existence and characterize the properties of pure strategy Oligopoly
Equilibria. We ¯rst provide a characterization of pure strategy OE capacities. Using this charac-
terization, we show that the price-capacity competition game always has a pure strategy Oligopoly
Equilibrium. We then use this characterization to study the e±ciency properties of pure strategy
Oligopoly Equilibria in the next section.
Proposition 7 Assume that °i < R for some i = 1;2. A capacity vector c = (c1;c2) is an OE
capacity if and only if c1 + c2 = 1 and
R ¡ °i
2R ¡ °i
· ci · c¡i; (12)
for some i = 1;2.
Proof. (Su±ciency) We ¯rst show that c1 +c2 = 1 together with (12) is an OE capacity. First,
since c1 + c2 · 1, Proposition 2 implies that the pro¯ts of ¯rm i = 1;2 are
¦i[p(c);x;c] = (R ¡ °i)ci; (13)
where p(c) denotes the continuation equilibrium price vector, which in this case is (R;R).
Consider a deviation ^ ci 6= ci by ¯rm i. If ^ ci < ci, Proposition 2 still applies and the resulting
pro¯t for ¯rm i is ^ ¦i[p(^ ci;c¡i);x;(^ ci;c¡i)] = (R ¡ °i)^ ci · ¦i[p(c);x;c], establishing that there
are no pro¯table deviations with ^ ci < ci.
Next consider ^ ci > ci. Clearly, if ^ ci;c¡i ¸ 1, Proposition 5 applies and ^ ¦i[p(^ ci;c¡i);x;(^ ci;c¡i)] =
0 so that the deviation is not pro¯table. So suppose that ^ ci+c¡i > 1, ^ ci;c¡i > 0 and either ^ ci < 1
or c¡i < 1. Proposition 4 applies and the deviation will induce a mixed strategy continuation
equilibrium ¹. There are two cases to consider: ^ ci > c¡i and ^ ci · c¡i.
² Suppose that ^ ci > c¡i, which by Proposition 6 implies that the deviation pro¯ts of ¯rm i are
^ ¦i[¹;x(¢);(^ ci;c¡i)] = R(1 ¡ c¡i) ¡ °i^ ci;
= (R ¡ °i)ci ¡ °i (^ ci ¡ ci);
· ¦i[p(c);x;c]
15where the second line exploits the fact that c1+c2 = 1 and the third line uses the de¯nition of
equilibrium pro¯ts from (13) together with ^ ci ¸ c¡i, establishing that there are no pro¯table
deviations with ^ ci > c¡i.
² Suppose that ^ ci · c¡i. Then by Proposition 6, we have
^ ¦i[¹;x(¢);(^ ci;c¡i)] =
R(1 ¡ ^ ci)^ ci
minfc¡i;1g
¡ °i^ ci: (14)
Let ^ cmax









Since ci < ^ ci · c¡i, we obtain from equation (12) that ^ cmax
i · ci. Therefore, for all
ci < ^ ci · c¡i, we have
^ ¦i[¹;x(¢);(^ ci;c¡i)] · ¦i[p(c);x;c];
establishing that there are no pro¯table deviations with ^ ci · c¡i.
This proves that any c1 + c2 = 1 together with (12) is an OE capacity.
(Necessity) Clearly, any c1 + c2 < 1 cannot be a pure strategy OE capacity, since the ¯rm
with °i < R can increase pro¯ts by raising ci. Similarly, any c1;c2 ¸ 1 cannot be a pure strategy
OE capacity, since the pro¯ts of both ¯rms are equal to 0. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction,
that there exists an OE capacity equilibrium with c1 + c2 > 1, ci > 0 for i = 1;2 and ci < 1 for
some i. Without loss of generality, we assume that c1 ¸ c2. Then Proposition 6 implies that
¦1[¹;x(¢);c] = R(1 ¡ c2) ¡ °1c1: (16)
Consider the deviation to ^ c1 = 1 ¡ c2 < c1 by ¯rm 1, which by Proposition 2 yields pro¯ts
^ ¦1[¹;x(¢);(^ c1;c2)] = R(1 ¡ c2) ¡ °1^ c1;
> R(1 ¡ c2) ¡ °1c1;
= ¦1[¹;x(¢);c];
where the inequality exploits the fact that °1 > 0 and establishes that such an equilibrium cannot
exist.
Next, to obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium with c1 +c2 = 1, but





16Now consider a deviation by ¯rm 1 to ^ c1 = ^ cmax
1 as given by (15). In view of (17), ^ cmax
1 > c1 and
from Proposition 6, the deviation pro¯ts are given by
^ ¦1[¹;x(¢);(^ cmax
1 ;c2)] =
(R ¡ (1 ¡ c1)°1)
2
4R(1 ¡ c1)
> Rc1 ¡ °1c1
= ¦1[¹;x(¢);c]:
To see that the inequality holds, we consider the function
f(c1) =
(R ¡ (1 ¡ c1)°1)
2
4R(1 ¡ c1)(Rc1 ¡ °1c1)
;
for c1 6= 0 (for c1 = 0, the inequality holds trivially). Note that the function f(c1) is strictly
decreasing in c1 for c1 ·
R¡°1










(R ¡ (1 ¡ c1)°1)
2
4R(1 ¡ c1)
> Rc1 ¡ °1c1:
The right hand side in the preceding relation is equal to ¦1[¹;x(¢);c] by (13). This establishes
that there cannot be any equilibrium OE capacity with c1 + c2 = 1 that does not satisfy (12),
completing the proof. Q.E.D.









c2 = 1 ¡ c1: (19)
Note that for all 0 < °i · R, i = 1;2, the capacity vector c = (1=2;1=2) satis¯es equations (18)
and (19). Thus, we immediately obtain the existence of a pure strategy Oligopoly equilibrium as
a corollary:
Theorem 1 The price-capacity competition game has a pure strategy Oligopoly Equilibrium.
6 Efficiency of Oligopoly Equilibria
In this section, we quantify the e±ciency losses of Oligopoly Equilibria. We take the measure of
e±ciency to be the ratio of the social surplus of the equilibrium capacity cOE to the social surplus
17of the social capacity cS, S(cOE)=S(cS) [cf. equation (5)]. We investigate the worst-case bound on
this metric over all problem instances characterized by °1 and °2, either for the worst equilibrium
among the set of oligopoly equilibria or for the best equilibrium among the set of equilibria.
Given capacity costs °1 and °2, let C(f°ig) denote the set of OE capacities. We de¯ne the








where cS is the social capacity given the capacity costs °i and reservation utility R [cf. (4)].
Following the literature on the e±ciency losses of equilibria, we are interested in the perfor-
mance of both the worst and the best OE capacity equilibria of price-capacity competition games.






which is commonly referred to as the Price of Anarchy in the literature (see [8]). We then study
the best performance in a capacity equilibrium given an arbitrary price-competition game, and






which is commonly referred to as the Price of Stability in the literature (see [2]).
Example 1 Consider a price-capacity competition game with two ¯rms, and °1 = R¡² for some
0 < ² < minf1;Rg, °2 = R¡²2. The unique social capacity is (cS
1;cS
2) = (1;0) with social surplus
S(cS) = ²:

























18Recall that when °1 = °2, S(cOE) = S(cS). Instead in the preceding example we have that as
°1 ! °2 (as ² ! 0), the e±ciency metric converges to 0.
The preceding example implies the following e±ciency result:






i.e., the Price of Anarchy of the price-capacity competition game is 0.
We next provide a non-zero lower bound on the Price of Stability of a price-capacity competi-
tion game.
Theorem 3 Consider the price-competition game with two ¯rms. Then, for all 0 · °i · R,








i.e., the Price of Stability of the price-capacity competition game is 2
p
2 ¡ 2 and this bound is
tight.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that °1 · °2. Then, the capacity vector (cS
1;cS
2) =
(1;0) is a social capacity (unique social capacity if °1 < °2), with social surplus S(cS) = R ¡ °1.









Since for all cOE 2 C(f°ig), we have cOE
1 + cOE
2 = 1, the supremum in the above expression is
clearly attained at some cOE 2 C(f°ig) with the maximum value of cOE
1 . By Proposition 7 and
equations (18)-(19), the maximum value of cOE











2R¡°2 in the objective function in (21), we see that the








19We are interested in ¯nding a lower bound on the preceding over all 0 · °i · R with °1 · °2, i.e.,











This problem has a compact constraint set and a lower semicontinuous objective function [note
that for °1 = R, the e±ciency metric satis¯es r(f°ig;cOE) = 1]. Therefore it has an optimal
solution (¹ °1; ¹ °2). For °2 = R, the objective function value is 1, showing that ¹ °2 < R. For all
°2 6= R, the objective function is strictly increasing in °1, showing that ¹ °1 = 0. It follows then






R attains the in¯mum, showing that










Finally, to see that the bound of 2
p
2 ¡ 2 is tight, consider the best OE capacity of the game






R. As ± ! 0, the surplus in the best oligopoly equilibrium
relative to social optimum limits to 2
p
2 ¡ 2. Q.E.D.
7 Equilibria and Efficiency With N Firms
We now generalize the results on the characterization and existence of pure strategy Oligopoly
Equilibria (cf. Section 5) and the e±ciency bounds (cf. Section 6) to N ¯rms. While all the
results provided so far generalize, the argument is slightly di®erent, and does not rely on explicitly
characterizing the expected pro¯ts of the ¯rms for all mixed strategy Price Equilibria.
7.1 Preliminaries
The next set of results generalize Propositions 2-5 of Section 4. Note that in our analysis of mixed
strategy price equilibria, it is su±cient to focus on capacity subgames in which ci > 0 for all
i 2 f1;:::;Ng (since if ci = 0, pro¯ts are equal to 0 for that ¯rm).
Proposition 8 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci · 1 and ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
Then there exists a unique Price Equilibrium in the capacity subgame [p;x] such that pi = R and
xi = ci for i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
Proof. Since
PN
i=1 ci · 1, it follows by the equivalent characterization of a °ow equilibrium that
for all p 2 [0;R]N, the °ow allocation (c1;c2;:::;cN) 2 W(p;c). Therefore, by charging a price pi,
¯rm i can make a pro¯t of
¦i[pi;p¡i;x;c] = pici;
20for all p¡i 2 [0;R]N¡1. This shows that pi = R strictly dominates all other price strategies of ¯rm
i, so that pi = R and xi = ci, i 2 f1;:::;Ng, is the unique Price Equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng and
assume that there exists some j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Then there exists no pure strategy Price
Equilibrium in the capacity subgame.
Proof. Suppose there exists a pure strategy Price Equilibrium (p;x). Without loss of generality
suppose that p1 · pj, for all j. Let P1 be the set of players whose price is equal to p1, i.e.,
P1 = fj : pj = p1g. The following list considers all candidates for a Price Equilibrium and
provides pro¯table unilateral deviations from each, thus establishing the nonexistence of a pure
strategy Price Equilibrium:
² p1 < minj6=1 pj, i.e., P1 = f1g: Then the pro¯t of ¯rm 1 is ¦1[p;x;c] = p1 minfc1;1g. A
small increase in p1 will increase ¯rm 1's pro¯ts, thus ¯rm 1 has an incentive to deviate.
² p1 = minj6=1 pj > 0: Let CP1 =
P
i2P1 ci be the sum of capacities of the ¯rms that belong to
set P1. If CP1 · 1, then we have to consider the following two cases:
{ p1 = minj6=1 pj = R: Then, since by assumption
PN
i=1 ci > 1, there exists ¯rm j,
j = 2 P1, such that pj > R and ¯rm j is making zero pro¯ts, since its price is greater
than the reservation utility R. Firm j can change its price to pj = R ¡ ², for some ²
with 0 < ² < R, and make positive pro¯ts.
{ p1 = minj6=1 pj < R: Then ¯rm 1 can increase slightly its price without a®ecting its
°ow allocation and thus increase its pro¯ts.
If CP1 > 1, we consider the following two cases:
{ x1 < minfc1;1g: Firm 1 can decrease its price slightly, and increase its °ow and its
pro¯ts.
{ x1 = minfc1;1g: Since CP1 > 1, there exists ¯rm j 6= 1, such that j 2 P1 and
xj < minfcj;1g, which can decrease its price and increase its pro¯ts.
² p1 = minj6=1 pj = 0. If CP1 · 1, then ¯rm 1 can increase its price and make positive
pro¯ts. Let's consider next the case when CP1 > 1. By assumption there exists some j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Note that j 2 P1, since otherwise CP1 ·
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Firm j can
increase its price and make positive pro¯ts.
21Q.E.D.
Similar to Proposition 4, the next proposition establishes the existence of a mixed strategy
Price Equilibrium in capacity subgames with no pure strategy price Equilibrium (proof follows
from Proposition 4.3 in [1], and therefore is omitted).
Proposition 10 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng
and suppose that there exists j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Then there exists a mixed strategy Price
Equilibrium in the capacity subgame.
Proposition 11 Let c be a capacity vector such that for each j 2 f1;:::;Ng,
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj ¸ 1
and ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng. Then, for all Price Equilibria [p;x], we have pi = 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng,
i.e., all ¯rms make zero pro¯ts.
Proof. The proof follows from a Bertrand price competition argument among the N ¯rms.
Q.E.D.
In the remainder of this section, we consider a subgame de¯ned by a capacity vector c, where
c is such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng, and there exists j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1.
Proposition 9 implies that there does not exist a pure strategy Price Equilibrium in this subgame.
However, Proposition 10 implies that a mixed strategy Price Equilibrium exists. Let ¹i denote the
probability measure of prices used by ¯rm i in this equilibrium. We denote the (essential) support
of ¹i by [li;ui] and the corresponding cumulative distributions by Fi. Next, we will provide a
series of lemmas regarding the structure of the mixed strategy Price Equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng and assume
that there exists j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Let l denote the minimum of the lower supports of the
mixed strategies, i.e., l = mini2f1;2;:::;Ng li. Let Pl denote the set of ¯rms whose lower support is
l, i.e., Pl = fi 2 f1;:::;Ng : li = lg. Then:
(i)
P
i2Pl ci > 1.
(ii) For all i 2 Pl, the distribution Fi does not have an atom at l.
Proof.
(i) Suppose to obtain a contradiction that
P
i2Pl ci · 1. Let l0 = mini= 2Pl li. Then consider ¯rm





0 p < l0
Fj(l0) p = l0
Fj(p) p > l0
where F is the original cumulative distribution. Essentially all the mass between l and l0
is shifted to l0. In such a deviation pro¯le, the °ow equilibrium remains unchanged since,
P
i2Pl ci · 1, but the prices charged for positive °ows by ¯rm j have increased, thus its
pro¯ts increase, leading to a contradiction.







where the second inequality holds by the assumption that
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. But this
contradicts part (i), showing that j 2 Pl.
We next show that l > 0. Assume to arrive at a contradiction that l = 0. This implies that
the pro¯ts of ¯rm j at any price vector are equal to 0 [see the characterization of mixed
strategy equilibria; cf. equations (9)-(10)]. However, by the assumption that
PN
i=1 ci¡cj < 1,
there exists a price vector and a °ow equilibrium at which the pro¯ts of ¯rm j are nonzero,
thus showing that l > 0.
Note that the set Pl cannot consist of only one ¯rm, since then this ¯rm has an incentive
to increase its price. Let m 6= n be two ¯rms that belong to Pl. Assume to arrive at a
contradiction that distribution Fm has an atom at l. By considering the pro¯ts of ¯rm n at
prices l¡², l+², and using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3[ii], it can be seen
that Fm cannot have an atom at l.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng and assume
that there exists j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Let u denote the maximum of the upper supports of
the mixed strategies, i.e., u = maxi2f1;2;:::;Ng ui. Let k be a ¯rm with the maximum capacity, i.e.,
ck ¸ ci, for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng. Then:
(i) At most one distribution Fi can have an atom at the maximum upper support u.
(ii) If the distribution Fi has an atom at u, then ci = ck.
23(iii) The maximum upper support u is equal to R.
Proof.
(i) We ¯rst show that at most one distribution can have an atom at u. We de¯ne the set
Patom = fi 2 f1;:::;Ng : Fi has an atom at ug:
Suppose to arrive at a contradiction that Patom has more than one element. It follows that
with probability ¦i2Patom(Fi(u+) ¡ Fi(u¡)) > 0, all ¯rms that belong to Patom will charge
a price of p = u.
Let Catom =
P
i2Patom ci and Dres = maxf0;1 ¡
P



















where the strict inequality follows by the assumption that
PN
i=1 ci > 1. This implies that
there exists some h 2 Patom, such that xh(pu) < minfch;1g, where pu is the price vector for
which all ¯rms in Patom charge the price u. Then, ¯rm h can increase its pro¯ts by reducing
its price to u¡² for some ² > 0 (since ¯rm h is undercutting the rest of the ¯rms in Patom).
This show that there exists at most one distribution, which has an atom at p = u.
(ii) Assume that the distribution Fi has an atom at u. We will show that ci = ck.
Let Pl denote the set of ¯rms whose lower support is l, i.e., Pl = fi 2 f1;:::;Ng : li = lg.
We ¯rst show that i 2 Pl. Suppose that i = 2 Pl. Then since
P
h2Pl ch > 1 [cf. Lemma 4(i)],
¯rm i's pro¯ts when he charges the price p = u are equal to 0. Using the assumption that
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1, and an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4(ii), it can also
be seen that k 2 Pl.
Suppose to obtain a contradiction that for the only ¯rm with atom at u, ¯rm i, we have
ci < ck. Let ¹ ¦i and ¹ ¦k denote the expected pro¯ts (plus the capacity costs) of ¯rms i and k
respectively at the mixed strategy Price Equilibrium (i.e., ¹ ¦i = ¦i+°ici and ¹ ¦k = ¦k+°kck,
where ¦j denotes the equilibrium pro¯ts of ¯rm j in the mixed strategy Price Equilibirum).
Using i;k 2 Pl, and the fact that Fi, Fk do not have an atom at the lower support l [cf.
Lemma 4(ii)], it can be seen that ¹ ¦i = cil and ¹ ¦k = ckl, which implies




24Next note that since the upper support of Fi is u and no other ¯rm has an atom at u, it is
also the case that








using equation (23), this implies










Now consider a deviation for ¯rm k to charging a price p = R¡² with probability 1 for some
² > 0. The expected pro¯ts for ¯rm k following this deviation satisfy








Since ck > ci and
PN

































Therefore, for ² su±ciently enough, the deviation for ¯rm k is pro¯table, yielding a contra-
diction and proving that ci = ck.
(iii) The proof of this part is similar to the proof of Lemma 3(iii) and is omitted.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 12 Let c be a capacity vector such that
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng and
suppose that there exists j with
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1. Let ¹ c = maxi=1;:::;N ci. Let u denote the
maximum of the upper supports of the mixed strategies, i.e., u = maxi2f1;2;:::;Ng ui. For ¯rm j,












¹ c ¡ °jcj; if Fj has no atom at u;
R
³




¡ °jcj; if Fj has an atom at u:
Proof. Let ¹ ¦j = ¦j + °jcj as in the proof of Lemma 5. If the distribution of ¯rm j, Fj, has
an atom at the maximum upper support, then Lemma 5 implies that Fj is the only distribution
25having an atom at the maximum upper support u = R and, moreover, cj = ¹ c. Firm j is charging

















Thus, ¹ ¦j = R
³




and the expected pro¯ts of ¯rm j are given by
¦j[¹;x(¢);c] = R
Ã






as claimed in the proposition.
Suppose next that Fj does not have an atom at the maximum upper support. We consider
the following two cases:
² None of the distributions have an atom at u. Then, using the Flow Equilibrium characteri-
zation given in Proposition 1, we have that the equilibrium pro¯ts for ¯rm j at price pj = R
are given by








Note that ¯rm j has to satisfy cj = ¹ c. Assume otherwise and let ¯rm k be such that ck = ¹ c.
Then, as argued in Lemma 4, both ¯rm j, which is such that
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj < 1, and ¯rm k
belong to set Pl (recall that Pl = fi : li = lg, where l is the minimum lower support). Using
the Flow Equilibrium characterization we have that








However, since j;k 2 Pl [as in the proof of Lemma 5] then ¹ ¦k = ¹ ¦j
ck
cj . For this to be true,
















² The distribution Fk has an atom at the maximum upper support, for some k 6= j. Then by
the ¯rst part of the proof ck = ¹ c and ¹ ¦j = R(1 + ¹ c ¡
PN
i=1 ci). Moreover, j;k 2 Pl, which
26implies that

























7.2 Oligopoly Equilibria With N Firms
In this section, we provide a characterization of Oligopoly Equilibria capacities with N ¸ 2 ¯rms.
Similar to the analysis for two ¯rms, we will use this characterization to establish the e±ciency
properties of Oligopoly Equilibria.
Proposition 13 Assume that °i < R for some i. Let k be a ¯rm with the maximum capacity,
i.e., ck ¸ ci for all k 2 f1;:::;Ng. A capacity vector c is an OE capacity if and only if
PN




¢ (ci + ck) · ci · ck; (24)
for all i 6= k.
Proof. (Su±ciency) We ¯rst show that
PN
i=1 ci = 1 together with (24) de¯ne an OE capacity.
Note that since
PN
i=1 ci · 1, Proposition 8 implies that the pro¯ts of ¯rm i;i 2 f1;:::Ng, are
¦i[p(c);x;c] = (R ¡ °i)ci; (25)
where p(c) denotes the continuation equilibrium price vector, which in this case is (R;:::;R).
Consider a deviation ^ ci 6= ci by ¯rm i. If ^ ci < ci, Proposition 8 still applies and the resulting
pro¯t for ¯rm i is ^ ¦i[p(^ ci;c¡i);x;(^ ci;c¡i)] = (R ¡ °i)^ ci · ¦i[p(c);x;c], establishing that there
are no pro¯table deviations with ^ ci < ci.
Next consider ^ ci > ci. Clearly, if ci = 0,
PN
i=1 ci = 1 and ^ ci = 1 (i.e., ¯rm i changed its capacity
from 0 in the original vector to 1 in the new), Proposition 11 applies and ^ ¦i[p(^ ci;c¡i);x;(^ ci;c¡i)] =
0 so that the deviation is not pro¯table. Therefore, we must have
P
j6=i cj + ^ ci > 1, cj > 0 for
j 2 f1;:::;Ng and
P
j6=i cj < 1. In this case, Proposition 10 applies and the deviation will induce
a mixed strategy continuation equilibrium ¹. We consider the following two cases:
² Firm i has the maximum capacity in the new subgame, i.e., ^ ci ¸ cj, for all j. Then,
27Proposition 12 implies that the deviation pro¯ts of ¯rm i are







A ¡ °i^ ci;
= (R ¡ °i)ci ¡ °i (^ ci ¡ ci);
· ¦i[p(c);x;c]:
Thus, in this case, there is no pro¯table deviation.
² Firm i does not have the maximum capacity in the new subgame, i.e., there exists some k
such that ck is the maximum capacity and ck > ^ ci. Then by Proposition 12,









¡ °i^ ci: (26)
Let ^ cmax













From equation (24) we have that
R¡°i
2R¡°i ¢ (ci + ck) · ci , which implies that ^ cmax
i · ci.
Therefore, for all ci < ^ ci · ck, we have
^ ¦i[¹;x(¢);(^ ci;c¡i)] · ¦i[p(c);x;c];
establishing that there are no pro¯table deviations with ^ ci · ck.
This proves that any
PN
i=1 ci = 1 together with (24) is an OE capacity.
(Necessity) Any capacity vector c such that
PN
i=1 ci < 1 cannot be a pure strategy OE
capacity, since the ¯rm with °i < R can increase pro¯ts by raising ci. Similarly, any capacity
vector c such that for all j,
PN
i=1 ci ¡ cj ¸ 1 cannot be a pure strategy OE capacity, since the
pro¯ts of all ¯rms are equal to 0. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists an OE
capacity equilibrium with
PN
i=1 ci > 1, ci > 0 for i 2 f1;:::;Ng and suppose that there exists j
with
PN








A ¡ °kck: (28)
28Consider the deviation to ^ ck = 1 ¡
P
i6=k ci < ck by ¯rm k, which yields pro¯ts

















establishing that such an equilibrium cannot exist.
Next, to obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium with
PN
i=1 ci = 1,




(c1 + ck): (29)
Now consider a deviation by ¯rm 1 to ^ c1 = ^ cmax
1 as given by (27). In view of (29), ^ cmax
1 > c1 and




















j6=1;k cj ¡ c1)
;
> Rc1 ¡ °1c1;
= ¦1[¹;x(¢);c];
This establishes that there cannot be any equilibrium OE capacity with
PN
i=1 ci = 1 that does
not satisfy (24), completing the proof. Q.E.D.
7.3 Efficiency of Oligopoly Equilibria With N Firms
We next investigate the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability for oligopoly equilibria with N
¯rms. The following example shows that the e±ciency loss in the worst oligopoly equilibrium
(Price of Anarchy) can again be arbitrarily high.
Example 2 Consider a price-capacity competition game with two ¯rms, and °1 = R¡² for some















(R + ²)(N ¡ 1)
;:::;
R
(R + ²)(N ¡ 1)
¶
;













The preceding example implies the following e±ciency result:






i.e., the Price of Anarchy of the price-capacity competition game is 0.
Next we provide a non-zero lower bound on the Price of Stability of a price-capacity competition
game.
Theorem 5 Consider the price-competition game with N ¯rms, N ¸ 2. Then, for all 0 · °i · R,







i.e., the Price of Stability of the price-capacity competition game is 2(
p
N ¡ 1)=(N ¡ 1) and this
bound is tight.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that °1 · mini2f2;:::;Ng °i and that °1 < R [if °1 = R,




N) = (1;0;:::;0) is a social capacity, with social surplus S(cS) = R¡°1.










Since for all cOE 2 C(f°ig), we have
PN
i=1 cOE
i = 1, the supremum in the above expression is
clearly attained at some cOE 2 C(f°ig) with the maximum value of cOE
1 . By Proposition 13, the
maximum value of cOE









1 = R=(R +
PN
i=2(R ¡ °i)) and cOE
i = (R ¡ °i)=(R +
PN
i=2(R ¡ °i)) for i 2
f2;:::;Ng in the objective function in (30), we see that the optimal value is given by
R ¡ R°1=(R +
PN
j=2(R ¡ °j) ¡
PN





We are interested in ¯nding a lower bound on the preceding over all 0 · °i · R with °1 ·




R ¡ R°1=(R +
PN
j=2(R ¡ °j) ¡
PN





This problem has a compact constraint set and a lower semicontinuous objective function [note
that for °1 = R, the e±ciency metric satis¯es r(f°ig;cOE) = 1]. Therefore it has an optimal
solution (¹ °1; ¹ °2;:::; ¹ °N). For °2 = ::: = °N = R, the objective function value is 1, showing that
there should exist at least an i such that ¹ °i < R. For all (°2;:::;°N) 6= (R;:::;R), the objective
function is strictly increasing in °1, showing that ¹ °1 = 0. Moreover it is not hard to see that the
optimal solution to (32) will satisfy (¹ °1; ¹ °2;:::; ¹ °N)=(0; ¹ °;:::; ¹ °), i.e., ¹ °2 = ::: = ¹ °N = ¹ °. It follows











Finally, to see that this bound is tight, consider the best OE capacity of the game with
°1 = ± > 0 and











An interesting implication of this result is that as the number of players increases not only is
the Price of Anarchy equal to zero, but the Price of Stability also goes to zero. Therefore, while
coordination with a limited number of players can ensure that ine±ciencies remain bounded when
there are many competing ¯rms even the best equilibrium has unbounded ine±ciency. This result
is interesting in part because it goes against a naive conjecture that increasing the number of
oligopolistic competitors should increase e±ciency (or even ensure that the equilibrium limits to
a competitive allocation). The reason why this naive intuition does not apply in this case is that
as the number of ¯rms increases, investment incentives become potentially more distorted.
318 Stackelberg Leader Game
We have so far characterized the set of pure strategy equilibria in the baseline price-capacity
competition game, where a set of competing ¯rms choose capacity simultaneously ¯rst and then
compete in prices (and users allocate their demands in the third stage). The analysis has shown
that di®erent equilibria within this set have widely di®ering e±ciency features. In particular, the
worst equilibrium from the set of pure strategy equilibria can have arbitrarily low e±ciency, while
if we select the best equilibrium from the set of equilibria, the worst e±ciency performance will
be 2(
p
N ¡ 1)=(N ¡ 1) (in particular, 2
p
2 ¡ 2 with two ¯rms). This raises the question of how
the equilibrium will be selected from the set of pure strategy equilibria and whether some type of
regulation may be used to a®ect equilibrium selection.
While an analysis on equilibrium selection is beyond the scope of the current paper, there
is a natural and simple multi-stage game that implements the best equilibrium. In this section,
we discuss this multi-stage game, which involves the ¯rms choosing their capacities sequentially,
acting in reverse order of their capacity costs. In the special case with two ¯rms, this is equivalent
to the lower-cost ¯rm acting as the Stackelberg leader and choosing its capacity ¯rst.
To simplify the exposition, in this section we suppose that N =2 and again use i and ¡i to
denote the two ¯rms. In this case, the Stackelberg game works as follows: if °i < °¡i, ¯rm i moves
¯rst and chooses ci. Then ¯rm ¡i, after observing ci, chooses c¡i. After the capacity choices, the
two ¯rms simultaneously choose prices, and after capacities and prices are revealed, users allocate
their demand. If °i = °¡i, the two ¯rms choose their capacities at the same time.
This game form may result as a focal point, giving the ¯rst-mover advantage to the low cost
¯rm. Alternatively, if the low cost ¯rm is an incumbent in the industry, we may think that this
equilibrium will arise naturally, since the incumbent may have chosen its capacity before the new
entrant. However, it is possible to imagine situations in which the lower cost ¯rm is the entrant
not the incumbent, in which case such a Stackelberg game will not arise naturally.
For the rest of this section, let us suppose that °1 < °2, and by a Stackelberg game, we refer
to the multi-stage game where ¯rm 1 chooses its capacity ¯rst, followed by ¯rm 2, and then the
two ¯rms choose their prices simultaneously. A pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium is de¯ned
as follows.
De¯nition 5 [Stackelberg Equilibrium] For a given c1 ¸ 0, let BR2(c1) denote the set of
best response capacities for ¯rm 2, i.e.,














2 )] ¸ ¦1[¹;x(¢);c1;c2]; (33)
for all c1 ¸ 0, [¹;x(¢)] 2 MPE(c1;c2), and c2 2 BR2 (c1):
Proposition 14 Suppose that °1 < °2 < R. Then there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
in which
cSE















Proof. (Existence) It follows from the su±ciency part of proof of Proposition 7 that given cSE
1 ,
cSE






. To see that there is no deviation for ¯rm
1, ¯rst note that any c1 < cSE
1 gives lower pro¯ts. Next consider c1 > cSE
1 . An argument identical
to that in the proof of Proposition 7 shows that the best response of ¯rm 2 to such c1 will satisfy
c1 + c2 > 1. Since




the analysis in the proof of Proposition 7 establishes that ¯rm 1 will make lower pro¯ts.
(Uniqueness) From Proposition 7, this is the equilibrium with the highest level of c1. Any
other choice of c1 can be improved upon by ¯rm 1 deviating to cSE
1 . Q.E.D.
Denote the set of Stackelberg equilibria by SE (f°ig). Combining this result with Theorem 2,
we have the following result.
Theorem 6 Consider the Stackelberg game described above with two ¯rms. Then, for all 0 ·








i.e., both the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability of the Stackelberg game are 2
p
2¡2 and
this bound is tight.
339 Simultaneous Capacity-Price Selection Game
In this section, we consider the alternative one-stage competition between the two ¯rms: ¯rms
simultaneously choose the capacity levels ci on their links and the price pi they will charge per
unit bandwidth. Given the price and the capacity set by the other ¯rm, p¡i; c¡i, the pro¯t of
¯rm i is
¦i[(pi;p¡i);x;(ci;c¡i)] = pixi ¡ °ici;
where x 2 W[p;c], i.e., x is a °ow equilibrium given the price vector p and the capacity vector
c. The objective of each ¯rm is to maximize pro¯ts. We next de¯ne the one-stage Oligopoly
Equilibrium for this competition model.
De¯nition 6 A vector [c¤;p¤;x¤] is a (pure strategy) one-stage Oligopoly Equilibrium (OE) if








for all pi ¸ 0, ci ¸ 0, and for all x 2 W[(pi;p¤
¡i);(ci;c¤
¡i)].
Proposition 15 Consider N ¯rms playing the one-stage game described above with N ¸ 2.
Given any °i, with 0 < °i < R, i 2 f1;:::;Ng, there does not exist a one-stage Oligopoly Equilib-
rium.
Proof. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists a one-stage Oligopoly Equilibrium
[c¤;p¤;x¤]. We ¯rst show that in this equilibrium, we must have
PN
i=1 c¤
i = 1 and p¤
i = R. If
PN
i=1 c¤




the pro¯t of ¯rm 1 is given by
¦1[p¤;x¤;c¤] = (p1 ¡ °1)c¤
1: (35)
Since °1 < R, by increasing c¤
1 slightly, ¯rm 1 increases its pro¯ts, contradicting the claim that




i > 1. Then there exists j 2 f2;3;:::;Ng for which x¤
j < c¤
j. Clearly it
is pro¯table for ¯rm j to deviate to (cj;pj) = (x¤
j;pj), since it reduces its capacity costs without
a®ecting its price and °ow allocation.
Hence, we must have
PN
i=1 c¤
i = 1 and also p¤
i = R by equation (35). If c¤
1 = 0, then since
x¤
1 = 0, ¯rm 1 can increase its capacity level and make positive pro¯ts. Assume next that c¤
1 = ²
for some ² > 0. Then the pro¯t of any ¯rm j 2 f2;:::;Ng is at most (R ¡ °j)(1 ¡ ²). But if
¯rm j changes its capacity and price to (cj;pj) = (1;R ¡ ±) for some ± > 0 and ± < (R ¡ °j)², it
34will make a pro¯t of R ¡ ± ¡ °j > (R ¡ °j)(1 ¡ ²), showing that there does not exist a one-stage
Oligopoly Equilibrium. Q.E.D.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the e±ciency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where ¯rms compete
over capacities and prices. This problem is not only of theoretical interest, but it is relevant
for understanding the extent of potential ine±ciencies that may arise in the process of capacity
extension in modern communication networks.
To isolate the main economic interactions, we considered the following simple game form. First,
¯rms independently choose their capacity levels. Second, after the capacity levels are observed,
they set prices. Finally, consumers allocate their demands across the ¯rms. This game has
an obvious similarity to Kreps and Scheinkman's model of quantity precommitment and price
competition, [9], but it is simpler because demand is inelastic and because results do not have to
rely on speci¯c rationing rules.
Using similar ideas to the analysis in [9] and in [1], we characterized the entire set of pure strat-
egy equilibria. A pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium always exists in this game but is supported
by mixed strategies o®-the-equilibrium path. The complete characterization of the equilibrium set
enables us to investigate the worst-case e±ciency properties of oligopoly equilibria.
Our ¯rst result here is that e±ciency in the worst oligopoly equilibria (also referred to as the
Price of Anarchy) of this game can be arbitrarily low. However, we also show that if the best
oligopoly equilibrium is selected, the worst-case e±ciency loss (also referred to as the Price of
Stability) can be bounded. With two ¯rms, this bound is tight and equal to 2
p
2 ¡ 2. With
an arbitrary number of ¯rms, N, the bound is again tight and equal to 2(
p
N ¡ 1)=(N ¡ 1).
Interestingly, this bound goes to zero as the number of ¯rms, N, increases. This result contrasts
with a naive intuition that the e±ciency of oligopoly equilibrium should improve as the number
of ¯rms increases. The reason why this intuition does not apply in the current context is that
with the greater number of competitors, ex ante investment incentives become potentially more
distorted.
We also suggested a simple way of implementing the best oligopoly equilibrium, which involves
the lower cost ¯rms acting before higher cost ¯rms as the \Stackelberg leaders" and choosing their
capacities. With two ¯rms, the Stackelberg game gives a unique equilibrium, with the e±ciency
loss bounded by 2
p
2 ¡ 2.
Finally, we studied an alternative game form where capacities and prices are chosen simulta-
35neously and showed that it always fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium. These results suggest
that the timing of capacity and price choices in oligopolistic environments is important both for
the existence of equilibrium and the extent of e±ciency losses.
Many features of the model analyzed here were chosen to simplify the exposition. The analysis
here can be easily generalized to arbitrary (convex) costs functions for investment in capacities,
without changing the essence of the analysis or the results.
Another more important generalization is to include potential congestion costs, which are an
important feature of many communication networks. Existence and e±ciency of oligopoly equi-
libria with congestion costs (but without capacity investments) are analyzed in [1], and existence
and e±ciency of oligopoly equilibria with congestion costs and with capacity investments in the
case with symmetric ¯rms are studied in [15]. The problem is much more challenging when there
are asymmetries, either in the costs of investing in capacity or in the extent of congestion costs
within a subnetwork. We leave the analysis of this general model to future work.
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